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SEXUAL BATTERY: MIXED-SIGNAL LEGISLATION
REVEALS NEED FOR FURTHER REFORM
BARBARA FROMM
I
O N OCTOBER 4, 1989, a jury in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, ac-
quitted a Georgia man of charges that he had kidnapped and
sexually assaulted a Broward County woman at knifepoint.1 The ac-
quittal itself might have had limited impact had it not been for the
statement made by the jury foreman after the verdict was announced:
"She asked for it," he claimed; "[s]he was advertising for sex." ' 2 An-
other juror agreed: "We felt she was up to no good [by] the way she
was dressed." 3
The "way she was dressed" at the time of the alleged assault in-
cluded a short, white, lace skirt, a brief top, a leather belt, and no
underwear. 4 The blame-the-victim verdict received national attention.5
Outraged feminists decried the verdict and its sexist message. 6 The al-
leged victim contended on national television that she was sexually as-
saulted by a stranger and then victimized by the criminal justice
system. 7 She became a symbol of the bias that exists against women
who report that they have been raped only to feel doubly violated by a
system that undermines their credibility and blames them for provok-
ing the attack.
The acquittal, on what appeared to be the ground that the victim
induced the assault by her provocative attire, sparked the passage of
legislation during the 1990 session of the Florida Legislature to limit
the admissibility of a victim's manner of dress in a prosecution for
sexual battery.8 The legislation amends section 794.022(3), Florida
1. Fort Lauderdale News-Sun Sentinel, October 6, 1989, at IA, col. 4. See also Brecher,
The Whole Story, The Miami Herald, Nov. 26, 1989, Tropic, at 11.
2. Fort Lauderdale News-Sun Sentinel, October 6, 1989, at IA, col. 4.
3. Id. at IA, col. 4-6A, col. 1.
4. Id. See also Brecher, supra note 1, at 14.
5. Brecher, supra note 1. See also Women Under Assault, NEWSWEEK, July 16, 1990, at 23
[hereinafter NEWSWEEK]. Violence Against Women Act of 1990, Hearings Before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. (1990) (statement of Helen Neuborne, Execu-
tive Director, National Organization for Women Legal Defense and Education Fund) [hereinaf-
ter Hearings].
6. Fort Lauderdale News-Sun Sentinel, supra note 1, at IA, col. 4, 6A, col. 1; Brecher,
supra note 1, at 18-19.
7. Brecher, supra note 1.
8. Ch. 90-40, 1990 Fla. Laws 48 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 794.022(3)).
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Statutes, to preclude the admissibility in a prosecution for sexual bat-
tery of "evidence presented for the purpose of showing that [the]
manner of dress of the victim at the time of the offense incited the
sexual battery." 9
This Comment provides a brief overview of Florida's Sexual Bat-
tery Statute, including its rape shield provision. The legislation en-
acted in 1990 is examined in light of its potential to deflect blame
away from a sexual battery victim and to preclude the admissibility of
irrelevant evidence in a prosecution for sexual battery. Sexual assault
is discussed in terms of ongoing issues as well as those that will need
to be addressed in the future. Finally, suggestions are made to
strengthen Florida's Sexual Battery Statute to insure that it is the of-
fender, not the victim, who is held responsible for a sexual assault.
I. BACKGROUND
Florida stepped to the forefront of rape reform legislation by enact-
ing the Sexual Battery Statute in 1974.10 The reform legislation was
indicative of the need perceived by feminists and law-and-order
groups to redefine the offense of rape, the penalties involved, and the
manner in which the crime was prosecuted." Rape had long been a
crime that placed the victim rather than the offender on trial. Flori-
da's Legislature, like those of other states, sought to correct this injus-
tice.
A. Basic Provisions
Prior to October 1, 1974, Florida's statute broadly defined rape in
terms of having carnal knowledge of a person "by force and against
his or her will." ' 12 The enactment of the Sexual Battery Statute abol-
ished the offense of rape and replaced it with the crime of sexual bat-
9. Id. Section 90.404, Florida Statutes, was reenacted to incorporate the new provision
into the Florida Evidence Code.
10. FLA. STAT. ch. 794 (Supp. 1974). See generally, Note, Florida's Sexual Battery Statute:
Significant Reform But Bias Against the Victim Still Prevails, 30 U. FLA. L. RaV. 419 (1978)
(analyzing the provisions of Florida's Sexual Battery Statute).
11. See Bienen, Rape Ill-National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S
RTs. L. REP. 170, 172-73 (1980); Battelle Memorial Institute Law and Justice Study Center,
Forcible Rape: An Analysis of Legal Issues 1, 1-2 (1978) [hereinafter Battelle]; Largen, A Dec-
ade of Change in the Rape Reform Movement, 10 RESPONSE 4 (1987). Much of the literature on
rape law reform deals with particular issues such as consent, definitions, and restrictions on
admissible evidence. However, reform nationwide was a result of grassroots lobbying by coali-
tions of women's rights activists working with existing lobbying groups and legislators who
shared their concern about the need for rape law reform. Largen, supra, at 5-6.
12. FLA. STAT. § 794.01 (2) (1973).
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tery defined as "oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with,
the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of an-
other by any other object."' 3 The statute is gender neutral and de-
scribes varying degrees of the crime from a second degree felony to a
capital felony depending upon the age of the victim and the amount
of force used. 14 Force is divided into degrees that define both the
crime and the severity of the sentence. 5 Penalties are now enhanced if
the crime involves multiple perpetrators. 16 The statute no longer
speaks of the crime as being "against the will" of the victim, but in-
stead focuses on consent, defining it as "intelligent, knowing, and
voluntary consent" not to include "coerced submission.' 1 7 It recog-
nizes that a victim might be physically unable to communicate unwill-
ingness to participate in an act and establishes a first degree felony for
a sexual assault upon such a victim."
B. Rape Victim Shield
The rape shield provision of the statute is particularly significant to
a victim. It provides that the victim's testimony need not be corrobo-
rated, and that reputation evidence of the victim's prior sexual con-
duct is not admissible. 9 In addition, the provision states:
Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the
victim and any person other than the offender shall not be admitted
into evidence in a prosecution under s. 794.011. However, such
evidence may be admitted if it is first established to the court in a
proceeding in camera that such evidence may prove that the
defendant was not the source of the semen, pregnancy, injury, or
disease; or, when consent by the victim is at issue, such evidence may
be admitted if it is first established to the court in a proceeding in
camera that such evidence tends to establish a pattern of conduct or
behavior on the part of the victim which is so similar to the conduct
or behavior in the case that it is relevant to the issue of consentY'
This provision is intended to prevent a defense attorney from hu-
miliating and harassing a victim by introducing evidence of the vic-
13. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(1)(f) (1975).
14. Id. at (2), (3), (4).
15. Id.
16. FLA. STAT. § 794.023 (1989).
17. FLA. STAT. § 794.011 (1)(a) (1989).
18. Id. at (4)(a).
19. FLA. STAT. § 794.022 (1), (3) (1989).
20. Id. at (2).
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tim's entire sexual history. 2' Enforcement of the rape shield
emphasizes that evidence of a person's past consensual sexual encoun-
ters is not relevant to whether a victim consented to sexual conduct
with the defendant unless a distinctive pattern of similar behavior is
demonstrated. The significance of this provision lies in its potential to
focus a trial on relevant issues rather than on the chastity of the vic-
tim. The rape shield law is considered to be among the most signifi-
cant provisions of Florida's Sexual Battery Statute."
1. Constitutional Implications of Rape Shield Laws
Introducing evidence of a rape victim's past sexual conduct at trial
is one of the most controversial issues in a rape prosecution and one
that has received the most legislative activity. All fifty states have im-
plemented some type of rape shield law, either through statute, rule of
court, or judicial opinion. 23
Rape shield laws have been criticized as infringements upon a de-
fendant's sixth amendment right to confront adverse witnesses and to
call defense witnesses. 24 It is axiomatic that the right to confront a
witness includes the right to cross-examine the witness. Critics of rape
shield laws argue that precluding admissibility of a rape victim's previ-
ous sexual activity denies a defendant a right to a fair trial if the de-
21. Bienen, supra note 11, at 202 (discussing Florida's rape shield legislation).
22. J. CHAPMAN, M. LARGEN & B. SATH, SExuAL ASSAULT LEGISLATION: AN ASSESSMENT
FROM Tm FIELD 19-20 (Center for Women Policy Studies 1986). This study to assess reform in
sexual assault legislation was sponsored by the National Institute of Justice of the United States
Department of Justice. The study surveyed professional personnel in the criminal justice systems
in Florida, Georgia, and Michigan, and assessed the impact of reform legislation in those states.
The rape shield law was found to be the most significant reform provision in Florida.
23. Comment, The Rape Shield Paradox: Complainant Protection Amidst Oscillating
Trends of State Judicial Interpretation, 78 J. CnRm. L. & CR1MINOLOGY 644, 644 nn.l-3 (1987);
FED. R. EviD. 412.
24. Comment, supra note 23, at 656-57, 691; see also Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim
Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 544, 544-45, 556-60, 589 (1980);
Farhat & Kraus, Michigan's "Rape-Shield" Statute Questioning the Wisdom of Legislative De-
terminations of Relevance, 4 CooLEY L. REV. 545, 548-49 (1987); Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims
in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REv. 763, 802-
12 (1986) (discussing constitutional implications and proposing an alternative); Berger, Man's
Trial, Women's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1977) (provid-
ing an in-depth analysis of rape and rape law and proposing a model statute). Constitutional
issues regarding exclusion of evidence by use of rape shield laws involve both the sixth amend-
ment and the fourteenth amendment. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the ight ... to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him ...." The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment
was held to apply to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion provides, in part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law ...."
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fendant is prevented from cross-examining a witness so as to
introduce possibly exculpatory evidence. 21
The suggestion that rape shield laws are constitutionally infirm de-
rives support from the United States Supreme Court's decisions in
Chambers v. Mississippi26 and Davis v. Alaska.27 In Chambers, the
Court reversed a defendant's conviction, holding that the application
of evidentiary rules which prevented the defendant from impeaching
his own witness and introducing evidence in his own behalf rendered
his trial unfair and denied him due process of law. 2
8
In Davis, the Court set aside a shield law that protected the confi-
dentiality of a juvenile's record when the shield ran afoul of a defen-
dant's rights to confront witnesses against him. 29 The Court
emphasized that the defendant was not attempting to introduce evi-
dence to attack the youth's credibility, but rather to develop a theory
that the witness' testimony might have been motivated by fear of pro-
bation revocation. 0 The Court held that the defendant's right of con-
frontation was paramount to the state's policy of protecting juvenile
offenders, emphasizing that "[w]hatever temporary embarrassment
might result to [the defendant] or his family by disclosure of his juve-
nile record .. .is outweighed by petitioner's right to probe into the
influence of possible bias in the testimony of a crucial identification
witness."' The Court in Davis did not advocate a blanket prohibition
against shield laws but instead applied a balancing test. It is signifi-
cant that the justification for admitting the evidence was to prove pos-
sible bias, not to attack the credibility of the witness.
The debate about when a rape victim should be shielded from testi-
fying about past sexual conduct centers on an attempt to define those
situations in which a defendant's constitutional rights demand that
25. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 24, at 555-56.
26. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). In Chambers, the defendant was charged with shooting a police
officer. Another man, McDonald, admitted to defense attorneys and to friends that he had shot
the officer. When called as a defense witness at trial, McDonald recanted his confession and
denied that he committed the crime. Mississippi had a "voucher" rule that prohibited a party
from impeaching his or her own witness. Additionally, Mississippi did not recognize an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule for declarations against penal interests. The defendant was convicted and
sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Id.
27. 415 U.S. 308 (1974). In Davis, the defendant was charged with breaking into a tavern
and stealing a safe. The primary evidence against him was the testimony of Green, a juvenile,
who was on probation. A court rule, intended to protect the confidentiality of juvenile adjudica-
tions, prevented the defendant from impeaching Green by showing that Green's testimony was
motivated by fear of probation revocation. Id.
28. 410 U.S. at 302-03.
29. 415 U.S. at 317.
30. Id. at 311, 317-18.
31. Id. at 319.
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such evidence be admitted. Statutes tend to include two types of evi-
dence: 32 1) evidence of prior sexual relations with the defendant when
consent is at issue; and 2) evidence of specific sexual activity with a
third party to prove an alternate explanation for the physical indica-
tions of rape.
Admissibility of evidence depends upon its relevance. There is no
constitutional right to admit irrelevant evidence. 33 Opponents of rape
shield laws argue that evidence of a complainant's past sexual activity
is particularly relevant to whether complainant consented to the sexual
conduct being prosecuted. 34 While that position itself is arguable, it
must also be noted that not all relevant evidence is automatically ad-
missible. Relevant evidence may be excluded when its probative value
is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.35 The rationale behind rape
shield laws is that a victim's sexual history is of dubious probative
value and that admitting such evidence is highly embarrassing and
prejudicial.
Rape shield laws attempt to alleviate the tension that exists between
a rape victim's right of privacy and a defendant's right to confront
witnesses and present evidence. A victim rape shield is not intended to
preclude admissibility of evidence of a victim's sexual history that is
relevant to prove bias or motive on the part of the complainant or to
demonstrate that the complainant lied while testifying. However,
when the evidence is being offered on the issue of consent, it is
stretching the definition of "relevant" to suggest that a victim's prior
sexual conduct is automatically relevant to her consent to the sexual
activity that is the subject of the prosecution.36
2. Irrelevancy of a Victim's Prior Sexual Activity
Chief Justice Matthew Hale pronounced more than three hundred
years ago: "[Rape] is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be
proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, though never
32. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 24 at 552-53. Florida's rape shield law is typical of the
type described by Tanford and Bocchino.
33. E.g., United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 272 (8th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S.
930 (1979); People v. Thompson, 76 Mich. App. 705, 257 N.W.2d 268, 272 (1977); cf. FED. R.
Evm. 402.
34. The rationale behind this argument is that if a victim consented previously to sexual
conduct, she is more likely to have consented on the occasion in question. See generally Note, If
She Consented Once, She Consented Again-A Legal Fallacy in Forcible Rape Cases, 10 VALPA-
RAiso U.L. REV. 127 (1976). See also L. HOLmSTROM & W. BURGESS, THE ViCriM OF RAPE: INSTI-
TuTiONAL REACTIONS 177 (1978).
35. FED. R. EviD. 403.
36. Note, supra note 10, at 435-43; Gold & Wyatt, The Rape System: Old Roles and New
Times, 27 CATH. U.L. REv. 695, 721-22 (1978).
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so innocent. 3 7 For over a century, Lord Hale's proclamation resulted
in the rigid scrutiny of a complainant witness.3" It was assumed that a
charge of rape was fabricated or was the vengeful response of a spite-
ful female.
The premise that a reported rape was the product of a woman's
overripe fantasies or the result of her having been spurned received
substantial support from John Henry Wigmore.3 9 Dean Wigmore's
profound distrust of women who reported that they were raped is rep-
resented in his statement, "[no judge should ever let a sex offense
charge go to the jury unless the female complainant's social history
and mental makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified
physician. "4 Wigmore also advised:
Modern psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of errant
young girls and women coming before the courts in all sorts of cases.
Their psychic complexes are multifarious, distorted partly by
inherent defects, partly by diseased derangements or abnormal
instincts, partly by bad social environment, partly by temporary
physiological or emotional conditions. One form taken by these
complexes is that of contriving false charges of sexual offenses by
men.
4
'
Despite Wigmore's lack of concrete evidence 42 for his biased view,
this unfounded suspicion and distrust provided justification for the
37. M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (lst American ed. 1847).
38. E.g., Marr v. State, 494 So. 2d 1139, 1140-41 (Fla. 1986) (recounting the original pur-
pose for the Lord Hale instruction and its use in Florida). The Standard Jury Instruction in
Florida was: "If the testimony of the female is not supported by other evidence her testimony
should be rigidly examined, especially as it related to the nature and extent of the force used and
as it related to the question of whether or not consent was ever finally given." Id. at 1141. See,
e.g., Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788, 790 (Fla. 1976); Paramore v. State, 238 So. 2d 604, 605
(Fla. 1970); Christie v. State, 94 Fla. 469, 472-73 (Fla. 1927); Coker v. State, 83 Fla. 672, 93 So.
176, 178 (Fla. 1922); Smith v. State, 362 So. 2d 417, 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Berezovsky v.
State, 335 So. 2d 592, 593 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976); but see Pendleton v. State, 348 So. 2d 1206,
1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (no abuse of discretion in refusing to give special instruction regarding
weight of victim's testimony); Williamson v. State, 338 So. 2d 873, 874 (Hla. 3rd DCA 1976)
(trial court did not abuse discretion in refusing to specially instruct jury to rigidly examine prose-
cutrix' testimony).
39. For an understanding of the foundation for the pervasive mistrust of women who re-
port that they have been raped, see 3A WIGMoRE, EVmNCE § 924a, at 736 (Chadbourne rev.
1970).
40. Id. at 737 (emphasis in original).
41. Id. at 736.
42. For a detailed analysis of Wigmore's own lack of credibility, see Bienen, A Question of
Credibility: John Henry Wigmore's Use of Scientific Authority in Section 924a of the Treatise
on Evidence, 19 CAL. W.L. REv. 235 (1983); see also Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case:
A Feminist View, 11 Am. CRIm. L. REv. 335, 335-38 (1973).
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defense to discredit the testimony of a complaining witness by intro-
ducing evidence of her prior consensual sexual activity. The underly-
ing premise for this practice was that a woman who previously
consented to sexual activity was more likely to have consented to the
activity being prosecuted. The relevance of such evidence on the issue
of consent was simply assumed. Thus, even if it were believed that a
victim was not fantasizing that she was raped, evidence that she was
unchaste was considered relevant to show that she consented to the
assault. What was clearly a bias in favor of chaste women masquer-
aded for years as relevant evidence.43
Joint efforts of feminist and law-and-order grordps during the
1970's heightened public awareness of the prevalence of rape and the
difficulties inherent in prosecuting the crime. 44 Rape shield laws were
enacted to help insure that the defendant would be tried for the crime
of sexual assault, and to end the practice of trying the victim for en-
gaging in past consensual sexual behavior that proves little except that
she is human.45
Bias against women who report that they have been raped has a
deeply-rooted foundation that cannot be completely eliminated by leg-
islation. Courts have, however, consistently upheld the constitutional-
ity of rape shield laws,"6 thus insuring that evidence of a rape victim's
past sexual conduct is no longer routinely admissible evidence.
43. Note, supra note 34, at 12.
44. Supra note 11. See also Largen, History of Women's Movement in Changing Attitudes,
Laws, and Treatment Toward Rape Victims, in SExuUL ASSAULT 69 (M. Walker & S. Brodsky
eds. 1976).
45. Berger, supra note 24, at 12.
46. Meaders v. United States, 519 A.2d 1248, 1254 (D.C. 1986) (prejudice results when
cross-examination probes into victim's private life); State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, 113
Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d 946, 950-51 (1976) (subject to certain exceptions, evidence of victim's chastity
not admissible on issues of credibility and consent); People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 585
P.2d 275 (1978) (premise of rape shield is one of public policy); Roberts v. State, 510 So. 2d 885,
892 (Fla. 1987) (rape shield precludes admission of evidence regarding victim's alleged activities
as prostitute, but such testimony might be relevant to the issue of consent); Young v. State, 562
So. 2d 370, 371 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1990) (victim's previous sexual encounters are irrelevant); Kaplan
v. State, 451 So. 2d 1386, 1387 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (rape shield properly applied in limiting
cross examination); Winters v. State, 425 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (evidence of
specific sexual conduct between victim and others properly excluded); Blunt v. State, 397 So. 2d
1047, 1047 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (testimony regarding victim's past sexual conduct properly ex-
cluded); Hodges v. State, 386 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (proffered testimony of
victim's prior sexual activity failed to establish a pattern sp as to be relevant to issue of consent);
People v. Williams, 416 Mich. 25, 330 N.W.2d 823, 825, 829 (1982) (evidence of complainant's
prior sexual relations with one of the defendants not admissible on consent or credibility); Peo-
ple v. Thompson, 76 Mich. App. 705, 257 N.W.2d 268, 272 (1977) (application of rape shield
does not deny constitutional right); State v. Gardner, 59 Ohio St. 2d 14, 391 N.E.2d 337 (1979)
(application of rape shield did not violate defendant's constitutional rights); Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 389 Pa. Super. Ct. 184, 566 A.2d 1197, 1202 (1989) (rape shield law bars testimony of
victim's prior sexual conduct unless it has probative value which is exculpatory to defendant).
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II. 1990 LEGISLATION
Responding to the outcry over the acquittal of a sexual battery de-
fendant on the apparent ground that the victim provoked the attack
by her manner of dress, 47 House Bill 1393 was introduced during the
1990 legislative session to preclude admissibility of a victim's manner
of dress in a prosecution for sexual battery.4 8 Cosponsored by Repre-
sentatives Elaine Gordon 49 and Anne MacKenzie,50 the initial bill
stated: "the manner in which the victim was dressed at the time the
crime was committed shall not be admitted into evidence in a prosecu-
tion under s. 794.011."l Representative Gordon explained to the
House Criminal Justice Subcommittee on Prosecution and Punish-
ment: "The manner in which a person is dressed has no relevance to
whether a crime has been committed. ' 5 2 Charlene Carres, an attorney
for the American Civil Liberties Union, expressed reservations about
limiting admissibility of evidence that a judge or jury might need to
consider, but stated that irrelevant evidence regarding the victim's
manner of dress is often brought before the court even though it has
no bearing on whether the victim consented. 3 The bill was unani-
mously recommended by the subcommittee.5 4
The bill received closer scrutiny when it came before the entire
House Criminal Justice Committee. Concern was expressed over limi-
ting judicial discretion as to what constitutes relevant evidence." A
representative of the state public defender's office opposed the bill,
claiming that it was being rushed into law based on one alleged abuse
and that it potentially violated a defendant's right to due process.5 6
Ms. Carres, again representing the American Civil Liberties Union,
countered that irrelevant evidence of how a victim was dressed is con-
sistently introduced at sexual battery trials . She addressed constitu-
tional concerns by proposing that the language of the bill be narrowed
to preclude admissibility of evidence that is introduced to demonstrate
that the victim provoked or incited the attack. 8
47. Brecher, supra note 1.
48. Fla. HB 1393 (1990) and Fla. SB 600 (1990) were identical.
49. Dem., Miami.
50. Dem., Fort Lauderdale.
51. Fla. HB 1393 (1990).
52. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Criminal Justice, Subcomm. on Prosecution and Punishment,
tape recording of proceedings (April 5, 1990) (on file with committee).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Criminal Justice, tape recording of proceedings (April 10, 1990)
(on file with committee).
56. Id. (Remarks of Rand Winter).
57. Id. (Remarks of Charlene Carres)
58. Id.
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This proposal was incorporated into an amendment included when
the Senate Judiciary-Civil Committee addressed a similar bill. Com-
mittee Substitute for Senate Bill 600, introduced by Senator Howard
Forman,59 narrowed the proposed "manner of dress" legislation to
provide that evidence could not be presented for the purpose of show-
ing that the manner of dress of the victim at the time of the offense
incited the sexual battery. 60 This amendment was seen as addressing
due process concerns while preventing admissibility of irrelevant evi-
dence that blames the victim for the attack and detracts from the issue
of whether the defendant committed a criminal act. The word "in-
cited" was included to counter the tendency of judges and juries to
perceive that the victim dressed in a way that provoked the attack. 6'
With the adoption of the amendment, the House and Senate bills
became identical. The Senate bill was laid on the table, while the
House bill was unanimously approved by both the House62 and the
Senate, 63 and signed into law by Governor Martinez on June 1, 1990. 64
As of October 1, 1990, Florida's Sexual Battery Statute no longer per-
mits evidence to be admitted in a prosecution for sexual battery to
show that the victim's manner of dress incited the attack.
The effect of this legislation is speculative. It is commendable that
the Florida Legislature attempted to step away from blaming the vic-
tim for provoking a sexual assault. However, the use of the word "in-
cite" gives credence to the premise that a person's clothing can, in
fact, incite a sexual assault, and that it is uncontrollable behavior, not
a violent assault, that has occurred. 65 This mixed-signal legislation at-
tempts to preclude the admissibility of irrelevant evidence while simul-
taneously reinforcing the myth that the victim somehow caused the
attack.
59. Dem., Pembroke Pines.
60. Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary-Civil, tape recording of proceedings (May 2, 1990) (on file
with committee).
61. Id.
62. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 433 (Reg. Sess. May 29, 1990).
63. FLA. S. JouR. 647 (Reg. Sess. May 29, 1990).
64. Ch. 90-40, 1990 Fla. Laws 48 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 794.022(3)).
65. See Martin, Gender Considerations in the Prosecution of Sexual Assault Cases at IA,
paper submitted before the Tallahassee Public Hearing of the Gender Bias Study Commission,
January 25, 1988. Dr. Martin discussed the widespread belief in society that people who are
sexually molested somehow cause the attack. "Some action, some way of dressing, some place
the victim went, something the victim said or did . . . is so powerful that [sic] it is [sic] com-
pletely overwhelms the will power of the assailant .. " Use of the word "incite" in the 1990
amendment lends credence to this myth. See also REPORT OF rm FLORIDA SUPREME COURT GEN-
DER BIAS STUDY COMGSSION 141 (1990) (assuming that a victim's dress or behavior causes the
rape removes responsibility from the offender) [hereinafter COPAWssION].
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Testimony in committee hearings addressed the issue of consent and
the fact that a victim's manner of dress was not relevant to the issue
of consent." However, the legislation passed does not speak to the
issue of consent. It amends section 794.022(3), Florida Statutes, which
precludes the admissibility of evidence of a victim's reputation. 67 If
the intent of the Legislature was to establish that a person's manner of
dress does not imply consent to a sexual act," a better approach might
have been to amend the definition of consent to provide that consent
is not to be inferred from a victim's manner of dress. In their charge
to juries, judges could instruct jurors to decide guilt or innocence
based on the facts and relevant evidence presented rather than on an
inference that the victim's manner of dress somehow provoked the at-
tack.69
It is doubtful that the 1990 amendment to Florida's Sexual Battery
Statute will preclude admissibility at trial of evidence of a sexual as-
sault victim's manner of dress. The law is narrowly drawn to preclude
presenting evidence to show that the victim's manner of dress "in-
cited" the attack. The language appears to be legislating against over-
zealous defense tactics. A defense attorney can, however, still attempt
to introduce evidence of a complainant's manner of dress, not to
show that the victim incited the attack, but to prove that the victim's
manner of dress was part of the total circumstances that led the defen-
dant to believe that the sexual conduct was consensual. Once this evi-
dence is before the court, it matters little how it was introduced.
If the Legislature is concerned about preventing admissibility of ir-
relevant and possibly prejudicial evidence in a sexual battery prosecu-
tion, it should amend the rape shield law to provide that the relevance
of a sexual battery victim's manner of dress be determined in a pro-
66. Supra notes 52-61.
67. Prior to the 1990 amendment, section 794.022(3), Florida Statutes (1989), provided:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, reputation evidence relating to a victim's prior
sexual conduct shall not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution under s. 794.011." This
language was added to section 794.022 in 1983. Prior to the 1983 amendment, evidence of a rape
victim's reputation for unchastity was routinely admissible. See Raulerson v. State, 102 So. 2d
281, 283 (Fla. 1958) (evidence of chastity admissible on issue of consent); Adkins v. State, 448
So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (reputation evidence as to unchaste conduct is admissi-
ble; specific evidence in this instance did not establish sufficient pattern to be admissible); Mc-
Elveen v. State, 415 So. 2d 746, 748 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (exclusion of evidence regarding
victim's reputation constitutes reversible error); Edmundson v. State, 146 So. 2d 395, 396 (Fla.
3rd DCA 1962) (evidence of victim's reputation for chastity is competent evidence).
68. Supra notes 52-61.
69. See Martin, supra note 65, at III B (suggesting that judges instruct jurors to decide guilt
or innocence on the facts of the case not on the "appearance, manner, or character of the vic-
tim."1).
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ceeding in camera. 70 The relevance would be determined on a case-by-
case basis. This would protect both the defendant and the victim, and
would eliminate statutory language that perpetuates the myth that the
way a person is dressed can provoke a sexual assault.
The legislative attempt to limit admissibility of evidence introduced
to show that a sexual assault victim provoked the attack underscores
the bias that still exists against the victim in a prosecution for the
crime of sexual battery.
III. SEXUAL ASSAULT-ONGOING ISSUES
Sexual assault and the bias against its victims is not simply indica-
tive of modern society. The rape" of women has a lengthy and un-
pleasant background in both mythology and history. 2 It has been
discussed as a statement of the power of men relative to women, 73 as a
sexual act over which an offender has little control, 74 and as a violent
crime .75
Rape law reform sought to ensure that the victim's interests would
be respected in the criminal justice process and to increase the number
of convictions. 76 However, the new laws did little to address the fear
women have of being raped. Women fear a sexual assault because
women are still being sexually assaulted. 77 The fear of being raped
70. This procedure is used in Georgia to determine relevance of a rape victim's mode of
dress. GA. CRuM. CODE § 24-2-3 (Supp. 1990).
71. Florida's Sexual Battery Statute does not use the term "rape." Throughout this Com-
ment the terms rape, sexual assault, and sexual battery are used to mean the same thing: sexual
conduct unwanted by the victim on the occasion in question.
72. See generally S. BROWNMLLER, AGAINST OUR WILL (1975); see also Gold & Wyatt, su-
pra note 36, at 695-701; Metzger, It Is Always the Woman Who Is Raped, in THE RAPE VICTIM 4
(D. Nass ed. 1977).
73. Metzger, supra note 72, at 4; M.T. GORDnON & S. RICER, THE FEMIALE FEAR 45 (1989);
S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 72, at 5.
74. H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE 55 (1980); Martin, supra note 65, at IA.
75. Comment, Rape Reform and a Statutory Consent Defense, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
ocy 1518, 1527 (1983).
76. Bienen, supra note 11, at 171-73, 177 (grouping the principal goals of reform legisla-
tion); H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, supra note 74, at 153-54.
77. CoMM ,ISSIoN, supra note 65, at 140 n.107 (testimony that 9807o of all rape victims are
women). "Over ninety percent of all sexually battered victims are female, and one in nine fem-
ales is likely to be raped during her lifetime." Id. at 143. The Commission report cited figures
for 1988 from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement which reported 6,524 cases of forci-
ble sexual battery. Id. Forcible sexual offenses reported in 1989 include: Forcible Rape-6,299;
Forcible Sodomy-l,531; Forcible Fondling-3,367. FLORIDA DEPT. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT,
CRIME IN FLORIDA: 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 43 (1989) (available from the Florida Dept. of Law
Enforcement). Nationally, the number of forcible rapes in 1989 was 94,504. National trends for
five and ten years show an increase in forcible rape of 7076 over 1985 and 14%0 above 1980. U.S.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGAnON, UNIFORM CRIt REPORTS: 1989, at 14-15 (1989). See also
NEWSWEEK, supra note 5 (citing data compiled by the Senate Judiciary Committee that also
indicates sexual assaults against women are on the rise).
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dramatically alters a woman's sense of personal freedom and shapes
the way in which she conducts her life.7 1 In short, it keeps her from
fully participating in life.
When a woman is raped, she must first decide if she will report the
violation. That a woman must give careful consideration to deciding if
she will even report such a personal and profound violation reflects
continued societal misunderstanding about the crime of rape and the
bias inherent in a prosecution for the offense. The victim knows that
attempts will be made to harass, humiliate, and discredit her. She un-
derstands that the key issue is not whether she was raped, but whether
people believe that she was raped.
A. Blaming the Victim
The presumption that a woman somehow "asked" to be sexually
assaulted and that, by inference, a rape did not actually occur is a
deeply-entrenched societal view. 79 Blaming the victim for a sexual as-
sault completely negates the intent of the victim with respect to her
actions and states clearly that the victim's viewpoint is not the one
that matters.
The doctrine of "victim precipitation" 0 provides continued cre-
dence for the unreasonable notion that a victim has done or has failed
to do something that provoked the attack. The theory posits "that in
a particular situation the behavior of the victim is interpreted by the
offender either as a direct invitation for sexual relations or as a sign
that she will be available for sexual contact if he will persist in de-
manding it.""' Such behavior may consist of acts of commission (she
was hitchhiking, she agreed to have a drink with a stranger, she ac-
companied a man to his residence) or acts of omission (she failed to
react strongly enough to sexual advances). "Thus, a 'passive' victim
like an 'active' one, becomes a 'mark' if the offender's interpretation
leads him to exploit her.' '82
This position not only interprets the crime from the viewpoint of
the offender, but it also renders rape virtually victimless in that the
78. A. MEDEA & K. THOMPSON, AGAINST RAPE 59-69 (1974). See also NEWSWEEK, supra
note 5, at 24 (discussing the restrictions women live under relative to men); M.T. GORDON & S.
RICER, supra note 73, at 13-17 (coping strategies).
79. COMMISSION, supra note 65, at 140; Martin, supra note 65, at IA; Comment, Rape and
Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALif. L. REV. 919, 929-30 (1973); Note, supra note
42, at 338-43; Gold & Wyatt, supra note 36, at 709-13. See also T. BENEKE, MEN ON RAPE 30-32
(1982) ("So long as men project their own sexual desires onto women, they will blame women
for rape.").
80. M. AMm, PArrERNS iN FORCIBLE RAPE 259-76 (1971).
81. Id. at 260-61.
82. Id. at 261 (emphasis added).
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victim cannot effectively focus the blame on anyone other than her-
self. The message is that rape probably did not occur; but if it did, the
victim wanted it, deserved it, and made the offender do it. 3
Research indicates that the majority of the public subscribes to the
"victim precipitation" philosophy.84 It is especially embraced by
members of the criminal justice system."5 This illuminates the claim of
rape victims that they were not believed by the police when they re-
ported that they were raped and that they felt they were the ones on
trial when the crime was prosecuted.8
6
The nature of the crime of rape is explained by Medea and Thomp-
son:
Rape is not a special, isolated act. It is not an aberration, a deviation
from the norms of sexual and social behavior in this country. Rape is
simply at the end of the continuum of male-aggressive, female-
passive patterns, and an arbitrary line has been drawn to mark it off
from the rest of such relationships.8 7
Drawing the line based upon the offender's viewpoint is a danger-
ous concept that allows rape to be perceived as a sanctioned, justifi-
able act. Defining rape from the male's viewpoint negates the crime
by silencing its victim.
The view that the behavior of women leads to sexual their assault
overlooks the socialization that resulted in such a concept. Men are
socialized to be sexually aggressive.88 They have a vested interest in
seeing their own sexual conduct as well as that of other men as some-
83. Burt & Estep, Who Is a Victim? Definitional Problems in Sexual Victimization, 6 Vic-
TimOLOGY 15, 24 (1981).
84. Placing the responsibility for an act of violence upon the victim serves to assuage the
public's fear of random violence. If people can find something about a victim that caused the
attack, they are comforted by the reasoning that such an atiack could not happen to them. This
"just world" theory is particularly harmful to a rape victim whose self-esteem is damaged not
only by the attack but by the inference that she somehow deserved it. See Jones & Aronson,
Attribution of Fault to a Rape Victim as a Function of Respectability of the Victim, THE RAPE
VicTim 27, 27-28 (D. Nass ed. 1977); M.T. GORDON & S. RIGER, supra note 73, at 120; Resick,
The Trauma of Rape and the Criminal Justice System, 9 JusT. SYs. J., 52, 57 (1984).
85. Klemmack & Klemmack, The Social Definition of Rape, in SEXUAL ASSAULT, 135, 135-
137 (M. Walker & S. Brodsky eds. 1976) (she was "asking for it;" it was a "friendly rape");
Feldman-Summers & Palmer, Rape as Viewed by Judges, Prosecutors, and Police Officers, 7
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 19 (March 1980); Bohmer & Blumberg, Twice Traumatized: The Rape
Victim and the Court, 58 JUDICATURFE 391, 396-99 (March 1975); Bohmer, Judicial Attitudes
Toward Rape Victims, 57 JUDICATURE 303, 303-07 (February 1974).
86. L. HOLmsTROM & W. BuRGEss, supra note 34, at 221-36.
87. A. MEDEA & K. THOMPSON, supra note 78, at 11.
88. Martin, supra note 65, at IB. Klemmack & Klemmack, supra note 85, at 136.
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thing other than rape.8 9 Additionally, it is to a male-dominated crimi-
nal justice system that a rape victim must turn for assistance. Judges,
prosecutors, and law enforcement personnel must bear responsibility
for dispelling the myth that a woman's behavior provides justification
for a sexual assault.9 Society's perception of rape victims will not
change until members of the criminal justice system cease blaming the
victim and begin acknowledging that it is the offender who "causes"
a criminal sexual assault.
B. The Consent Standard
"Under law, rape is a sex crime that is not regarded as a crime
when it looks like sex." 91 The difficulty lies in determining when sex-
ual conduct is, in fact, rape and by whose definition. A finding that
what occurred was a criminal act rests upon a belief that the victim
did not consent. It is ironic that the law negates a woman's determina-
tion of her own sexuality by concluding that if she provoked the sex-
ual assault, the attack is transformed into consensual activity, yet it
simultaneously insists that a woman can and must enforce her lack of
consent.
Proving lack of consent has always been problematic. 92 A victim
was once expected to resist an attack to her utmost physical ability if
she expected her allegation of rape to be believed. 9 Often her strug-
89. By defining rape from a male point of view, men can assuage any anxiety they might
have that their own behavior is in fact rape. See C. MAcKiNNoN, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE STATE 174 (1989). "It is not only men convicted of rape who believe that the only thing
they did that was different from what men do all the time is get caught." Id.
90. COMMISSION, supra note 65, at 159 (recommendations for judges and other members of
the criminal justice system).
91. C. MAcKiNNON, supra note 89, at 172.
92. A definition of consent and how it is to be determined in a prosecution for sexual bat-
tery has been the subject of much literature. See, e.g., Wiener, Shifting the Communication
Burden: A Meaningful Consent Standard in Rape, 6 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 143 (1983); Com-
ment, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 613 (1976); Note,
Focusing on the Offender's Forceful Conduct: A Proposal for the Redefinition of Rape Laws,
56 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 399 (1988) (proposing a burden-shifting criminal assault statute);
Bumiller, Rape as a Legal Symbol: An Essay on Sexual Violence and Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 75 (1987); Comment, Rape Reform and a Statutory Consent Defense, 74 J. CRIu. L. &
CRmtmoxoGY 1518 (1983) (hereinafter Rape Reform) (suggesting a combination of the Michigan
and Wisconsin statutes); Snelling, What is Non-Consent (In Rape)? 157; Hibey, The Trial of a
Rape Case: An Advocate's Analysis of Corroboration, Consent, and Character, in RAPE VICTIM-
OLOGY 164, 178-83 (L. Schultz ed. 1975).
93. Bailey v. State, 76 Fla. 213, 79 So. 730 (Fla. 1918) (evidence that defendant seized vic-
tim and, while choking her, forced her to engage in intercourse insufficient to show act was
against her will); Hollis v. State, 27 Fla. 387, 9 So. 67 (Fla. 1891) (insufficient evidence of rape
where defendant seized a fourteen-year-old girl, threatened to kill her, and forced her to engage
in intercourse); O'Bryan v. State, 324 So. 2d 713, 714 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (evidence that defen-
dant pushed victim to the floor and forced her to have intercourse insufficient to prove that act
was against the victim's will).
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gles were not sufficiently convincing, and courts held that what oc-
curred was possibly a form of seduction, but it was not rape.94 That it
was rape to the victim was of little consequence. The cases of State v.
Rusk9l5 and Goldberg v. State 6 exemplify the "seduction is not rape"
line of reasoning.
In Rusk, a strongly debated case, the victim met the defendant at a
bar and agreed to give him a ride home. Upon reaching his residence,
the victim declined his invitation to go inside with him. Rusk then
reached over and removed her car keys. The victim accompanied him
to his room where, through coercion and "light choking," the defen-
dant forced sexual intercourse upon the victim. 97 The case was heard
by the trial judge, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, and Mary-
land's highest court, the Court of Appeals, which reversed the defen-
dant's conviction.98 A total of twenty-one judges reviewed the
evidence. 99 Ten concluded that Rusk was a rapist; eleven that he was
not. 00 The judges who concluded that Rusk was innocent focused not
on his behavior but on that of the victim. They considered it to be less
than significant that she was in an unfamiliar neighborhood without
her car keys and in the company of a man who frightened her,
"lightly" choked her, and led her to believe that he would use addi-
tional force if necessary. A dissenting judge acknowledged that a
woman no longer must resist to her utmost, but maintained that
"[s]he may not simply say 'I was really scared,' and thereby trans-
form consent or mere unwillingness into submission by force." 01
In Goldberg, a young sales clerk was sold a story by the defendant
that he was a modeling agent and that she was an excellent prospect to
become a successful model.' °2 She accompanied him to his "tempo-
rary studio" where she engaged in sexual intercourse because she was
afraid to resist. 03 She told the defendant "no"' 4 but that was not
sufficient for either the defendant or the court. She was alone with the
defendant; there were no buildings nearby, and no one was available
to help her if she resisted his advances. Additionally, the defendant
94. Bailey, 76 Fla. 213, 79 So. 730; Hollis, 27 Fla. 387, 9 So. 67; O'Bryan, 324 So. 2d 713.
95. 289 Md. 230, 424 A.2d 720 (1981).
96. 41 Md. App. 58, 395 A.2d 1213 (1979).
97. 289 Md. at 232-35, 424 A.2d at 721-22.
98. S. ESTRICH, REAr RAPE 63 (1987).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 289 Md. at 255, 424 A.2d at 733 (Cole, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
102. 41 Md. App. at 59, 395 A.2d at 1214-15.
103. Id. at 1215.
104. Id.
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was much larger than the victim.' °5 The totality of these circumstances
was apparently lost on the court. It found that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to sustain defendant's conviction,' °0 observing that she did not
resist "to the extent of her ability" and concluding that the evidence
did not indicate that her lack of resistance was due to her fear of the
defendant."" Again the focus was not on what the offender did to the
victim, but rather what the victim failed to do.
Modern legislation sought to avoid this outcome by refining the ele-
ments of criminal sexual assault. Some reformers specifically excluded
the word "consent" from proposed legislation, electing instead to de-
fine rape in terms of the amount of force used.' °8 Other statutes rede-
fined consent to require proof of affirmative communication on the
part of the victim' 9 rather than allowing a court to draw its own infer-
ence.
Statutes that specifically exclude consent seek to focus on the be-
havior of the defendant rather than on that of the victim. Michigan's
Criminal Sexual Conduct statute does not mention the victim's sub-
mission to a sexual act or lack of consent to same. The defendant's
use of "force or coercion""10 defines the crime. However, Michigan
appellate courts have held that consent can still be raised as a de-
fense."' Omitting a statutory definition of consent gives rise to the
possibility that a court will rely on implied consent if there is not ade-
quate proof of force or coercion." 2 Cases involving "light choking"
or submission induced by fear could still be interpreted by a court as
incidents of seduction rather than rape.
Washington followed the Michigan approach by not mentioning
consent in cases where force is used or bodily injury is threatened or
inflicted. '3 A third-degree offense is established where "the victim did
not consent . . . to sexual intercourse with the perpetrator and such
lack of consent was clearly expressed by the victim's words or con-
duct. .... 11114 This provision appears to criminalize non-consensual
sexual conduct where there was no actual force, and the victim clearly
105. Id.
106. 41 Md. App. at 69, 395 A.2d at 1219.
107. Id.
108. E.g., MICH. Con,. LAWS. ANN. § 750.520(b), (c), (d), (e) (West Supp. 1990).
109. E.g., WASH. REv. CODE Am. § 9A.44.010(7) (Supp. 1990).
110. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 750.520(b), (c), (d), (e) (West Supp. 1990).
111. People v. Hearn, 100 Mich. App. 749, 755, 300 N.W.2d 396, 398 (1980) (holding that
eliminating need for proof of nonconsent did not preclude an accused from having the right to
allege consent as a defense).
112. Rape Reform, supra note 92, at 1541.
113. WASH. Rev. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.040 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
114. Id. § 9A.44.060(l)(a)(1988 & Supp. 1990).
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communicated lack of consent. It has not been effective in that re-
gard." 5
The Illinois Legislature took a different approach to focusing on
the conduct of the offender. Its legislative reform in 1984 redefined
consent to mean the "freely given agreement to the act of sexual pene-
tration or sexual conduct in question. Lack of verbal or physical resis-
tance or submission by the victim resulting from the use of force or
threat of force by the accused shall not constitute consent." 6 By re-
defining consent rather than eliminating it from the statute, the draft-
ers of the legislation sought to shift the focus from the victim's state
of mind to that of the accused." 7 Thus, the defendant must demon-
strate that the victim consented to the act. While the burden of prov-
ing consent appears to shift to the defendant, legislative history
indicates that consent is intended to be a defense that the accused can
raise by cross-examining witnesses, including the complaining wit-
ness." 8
The Model Penal Code defines rape as an act of sexual intercourse
committed by a male against a female not his wife." 9 The most severe
degree is reserved for those crimes in which the force or threat of
death or injury is employed.' 20 The crime is considered to be of a
lesser degree if the victim is a voluntary social companion of the of-
fender upon the occasion of the crime and previously had consensual
sexual contact with the offender. 2' This approach fails to recognize
that women are often forced into nonconsensual sexual conduct by
husbands or social companions, and that such a relationship does not
render the act less serious.
These varied approaches to the issue of consent underscore the dif-
ficulty that exists in determining what actually constitutes consent,'2
and how it can be demonstrated in a court of law. Commentators
have struggled with the concept of consent in trying to determine if it
should be an element of the crime, and, if so, how it is best defined. A
charge of rape is still as "hard to prove" today as it was in the time of
Lord Hale. On the continuum of sexual conduct, rape is still a crime
115. Loh, The Impact of Common Law and Reform Rape Statutes on Prosecution: An Em-
pirical Study, 55 WASH. L. REv. 543, 550-53, 556-59 (1980); S. ESTRICH, supra note 98, at 89.
116. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-17(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990).
117. Carey, The New Illinois Criminal Sexual Assault Statute, 16 Loy. U. Cm. J.L. 757,
765-67 (1985).
118. Id. at 766-67.
119. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Supra notes 92 and 93.
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that is defined by "legal language"' 123 rather than by an acknowledg-
ment that "no means no."
IV. FUTURE ISSUES
During the last decade, rape law has focused primarily on legislative
enactments designed to facilitate the reporting and prosecution of sex-
ual assault. These enactments sought to exclude the admission of irrel-
evant evidence and to lessen the harassment of victims. Future issues
will likely focus on what has long been tacitly acknowledged-that
"rape is an aggressive act against women as women."' 12 The signifi-
cance of legal reform to more effectively prosecute sexual assault
cases cannot be underestimated, but attention is rightfully being fo-
cused on the reality that women are the predominate victims of sexual
assault. 125
The United States Congress is currently considering legislation that
creates a civil rights remedy for gender-motivated sexual assault. The
"Violence Against Women Act of 1990"126 seeks to double federal
penalties for sexual assault and to permit victims to sue in federal
court for restitution. 27 It further proposes to establish a national com-
mission on violent crimes against women and allocate funds for local
law enforcement. 28 The proposed legislation signifies a national con-
sciousness-raising. 129 The principal sponsor of the bill, Senator Joseph
Biden, 30 emphasized the "need for the national psyche to acknowl-
edge there's something horribly wrong and for the law to reflect that
attitude."'31 Efforts are long overdue to develop a national consensus
that not only are violent attacks against women "horribly wrong,"
but also that women are not the architects of the assaults.
A. Acquaintance Rape
"Judicial procedures for handling 'acquaintance rape' promises to
be one of the major upcoming issues with which the legal system must
123. Bumiller, supra note 92, at 82-85 (focusing on the "language of rape").
124. Metzger, supra note 72, at 11.
125. Supra note 77 and accompanying text.
126. Violence Against Women Act of 1990: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. NEWSWEEK, supra note 5, at 23.
130. Dem., Delaware.
131. NEWSWEEK, supra note 5, at 23.
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learn to deal effectively and with fairness to the victim. "132 The notion
that rape is a crime in which the assailant is a stranger who "jumps
out from the bushes" is outdated and untrue. Assailants are known to
their victims in approximately one-half of reported cases, and an at-
tack by an acquaintance tends to involve a greater degree of vio-
lence. 3 3 Additionally, there is significant trauma that results from
being sexually assaulted by a person that the victim knows and
trusts.134
A study of seventy-one self-disclosed acquaintance or date rapists' 31
reflected that two-thirds of the men conceded that they were guilty of
rape in the legal sense, but contended that the fault for the rape re-
sided with the female. They saw her sexual demeanor as literally ab-
solving them of any guilt for what they admitted was forcible rape
against a nonconsenting female. 36
This tacit acknowledgment that rape is justifiable is of particular
concern on college campuses. Acquaintance rape in a college setting is
likely to be in the form of gang rape. 37 Gang rape has been described
as an example of "male bonding [which] stems from a contempt of
women." 3 It is particularly prevalent at fraternity parties where the
rape victim has consumed too much alcohol or drugs. 39 What she per-
ceives to be "friendly persuasion" on the part of the fraternity broth-
ers is part of a planned sexual assault. By the time she comprehends
the situation, she can no longer escape. Her protests are ignored; she
is raped by a group of fraternity brothers who do not consider their
behavior to be rape. 4  Their position is that "she asked for it.)'9' 4
132. Schafran, Overwhelming Evidence: Reports on Gender Bias in the Courts, TRiAL 28, 30
(February 1990) (quoting Wahl, J., chair of the Minnesota Task Force on Gender Fairness in the
Courts). See also M.T. GORDON & S. RIGER, supra note 73, at 27-29 (on acquaintance rape
generally).
133. CoMaOssioN, supra note 65, at 144. M. AMIR, supra note 80, at 234-35 (over half of the
offenders studied knew their victim); id. at 245 (the closer the relationship, the greater is the
violence against the victim); H. FEEaD & L. BIENEN, supra note 74, at 76-77.
134. Battelle, supra note 11, at 15; C. MAcKTNON, supra note 89, at 177. This is particu-
larly true in the case of spousal rape where the victim has to "live with her rapist." See Note,
Abolishing the Marital Rape Exemption: The First Step in Protecting Married Women from
Spousal Rape, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1219, 1222-1223 (1989) (justification that rape within marriage
or marriage-like relationship causes less victimization has no foundation in fact).
135. Kanin, Date Rape: Unofficial Criminals and Victims, 9 VICTIMOLOGY 95, 96-97 (1984).
136. Id.
137. Gang Rape on College Campuses, 7 RESPONSE 1 (March/April 1984); M.T. GoaoN &
S. RIGER, supra note 73, at 128.
138. S. BROWNMIU.ER, supra note 72, at 211.
139. Ehrhart & Sandier, Party Rape, 9 RESPONSE 2, 2-4; Martin & Hummer, Fraternities and
Rape on Campus, 3 GENDER & SoctETY 457 (Dec. 1989) (studying fraternities as groups that
encourage the sexual coercion of women).
140. Ehrhart & Sander, supra note 139, at 2.
141. Id.
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That they fully planned the attack and treated the young woman as
sexual prey is of no consequence. Sexual coercion, a felony crime, is
viewed as sport. Evidence suggests that this practice is particularly
pervasive among college athletes. 142 College sports stars reportedly en-
joy the privilege of readily attainable money, drugs, and sex.
Transgressions are forgivable, and the victims are frequently pres-
sured to drop charges. 141 College gang rape and every other form of
acquaintance rape must be recognized and prosecuted as a felony
crime.
B. Gender Bias
The pronouncements of Lord Hale and John Henry Wigmore pro-
vided a foundation for bias against women that continues to permeate
the court system. As of December 1989, thirty states'" had appointed
task forces to study gender bias. The studies thus far completed indi-
cate that gender bias is pervasive in the legal system and that women
are most often its victims. 45
New Jersey was the first state to establish a task force to study gen-
der bias in the courts.'4 Its findings indicated that rape cases are
"viewed from the wrong end of the telescope,' '1 47 with the complain-
ant being put on trial. The New Jersey report determined that a prose-
cution for rape focused on the victim's "dress, demeanor, conduct,
associations, and lifestyle" rather than on the defendant's threats and
use of force. 4 Nonstranger rape was not actively prosecuted.
49
The Florida Supreme Court created a Gender Bias Study Commis-
sion to determine in what areas of Florida's legal system gender bias
exists. 50 The two-year study concluded that discrimination based on
one's sex is a reality in the legal system.'' Testimony before the com-
mission identified a virtual mythology surrounding the crime of
142. Sex and the Sporting Life, TimE, August 6, 1990, at 76-77.
143. Id.
144. Schafran, supra note 132, at 28. See also Schafran, Documenting Gender Bias in the
Courts: The Task Force Approach, 70 JumDCATuRE 280, 284 (February-March 1977); Singleton,
Gender Bias Skews Justice for Women, TReAL 39, 43 (February 1990).
145. Schafran, supra note 132, at 28.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 30.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. CommssloN, supra note 65, at 2.
151. Id.
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rape. 1 2 "Real rapes" were those in which a virtuous person was at-
tacked by a stranger. Before a "real rape" is believed to have oc-
curred, there must be no circumstances indicating that the victim was
wearing the wrong clothes, or was in the wrong place at the wrong
time, or in some other manner precipitated the attack."' If a woman
had been drinking or otherwise put herself in a precarious position,
the Commission heard testimony that she was considered to be "look-
ing for it. '1 4 Such rapes were seen to be prompted by the victim, and
were not considered to be "real rapes."' 5
Although acquaintance rape accounts for one-half of all rapes, 56
prosecutors and law enforcement officials repeatedly testified in Com-
mission hearings that convictions in such cases were virtually "impos-
sible to obtain.' s7 State attorneys often did not even file charges in
such cases due to the unlikelihood of a conviction. 58 The Commission
concluded that the myths and assumptions which surround the crime
of rape serve "to deny victims of rape equal protection of the
laws." 159.
The gender bias task force movement is no longer in its infancy. 60
As task forces throughout the country continue to complete their in-
vestigations and report their findings, courts will be forced to address
the biased treatment of rape victims.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The 1990 amendment to Florida's Sexual Battery Statute signifies
that the Legislature acknowledges the bias that exists against victims
of sexual battery. It is the victim who is put on trial to prove that she
did not consent to sexual conduct, to demonstrate that she did not
"ask" to be assaulted, and to convince a judge or jury that even
though she previously engaged in consensual sexual conduct with the
defendant, she still maintained the right to say "no" at a later date.
152. Id. at 140. The Commission found that the mythology was reinforced by widespread
notions about sexual assault. The Commission reported on a survey of sixth to ninth grade chil-
dren in Rhode Island in which the majority of the children believed that "under certain circum-
stances" sexual abuse was okay. Some of the students believed that a seductively-dressed woman
is "asking to be raped," that forcible sex was acceptable if a man has been dating a women for
more than six months, and that rape is permissible among married couples. Id. at 142.
153. Id. at 140.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 144.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 142.
160. Schafran, supra note 132, at 28.
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Legislation alone cannot reform sexist notions about what constitutes
appropriate behavior for a woman, but it remains a viable avenue for
reforming a system that continues to put the victim on trial.
The definition of "consent" currently set forth in the Florida Sex-
ual Battery Statute should be expanded beyond the concept of "intel-
ligent, knowing, and voluntary." Consent should involve affirmative
words or conduct on the part of the victim indicating that consent was
freely given. It is suggested that section 794.011 (1)(a) be amended to
read: The term "consent" means intelligent, knowing, and voluntary
consent evidenced by actual words or conduct indicating that consent
is freely given and is not the result of coerced submission. Requiring
an affirmative showing of "yes" might be the best means of insuring
that a victim's "no" is properly interpreted.
Additionally, the rape shield section of the Sexual Battery Statute
must be strengthened to insure that only evidence relevant to whether
a crime has been committed is introduced in a sexual battery prosecu-
tion. The law currently allows evidence to be introduced regarding the
victim's past sexual conduct with the offender. This allowance encour-
ages an assumption that a victim's past sexual encounters with the de-
fendant are automatically relevant to whether she consented to the
conduct in question. Such evidence would not be relevant to the issue
of consent if the past conduct were not reasonably
contemporaneous 6' with the current offense. A showing should be re-
quired that the past conduct was reasonably contemporaneous with
the occasion complained of in the prosecution, and that it encouraged
the defendant to reasonably believe that consent was freely given by
the complainant. Relevance of the past conduct could be determined
161. Missouri incorporated this concept into its rape shield law. Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.015
(Vernon Supp. 1990). See State v. Jones, 716 S.W.2d 799, 803 (Mo. 1986) (evidence of com-
plainant's sexual conduct with defendant three years earlier not admissible); State v. Farmer, 719
S.W.2d 922, 929 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (not error to exclude evidence of prior relationship be-
tween defendant and complainant); State v. Boyd, 643 S.W.2d 825, 830 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
(could not inquire into alleged relationship between victim and defendant six months earlier);
State v. Crisp, 629 S.W.2d 475, 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (reasonably contemporaneous defined
as "originating, or happening, during the same period of time"). Kansas has adopted a similar
rule of evidence. RuLas OF Evm., K.S.A. 21-3525 (1988) (evidence of a complaining witness' past
sexual conduct with anyone, including the defendant, shall be presented at an in camera hearing
to determine its relevance). See State v. Stellwagen, 232 Kan. 744, 659 P.2d 167, 170 (1983)
(prior sexual activity, even with the accused, does not of itself imply consent); In re Nichols, 2
Kan. App. 2d 431, 580 P.2d 1370 (1978) (evidence of victim's prior sexual conduct with the
defendant properly excluded; constitutionality of Kansas' rape shield law upheld). See also Peo-
ple v. Hastings, 72 111. App. 3d 816, 390 N.E.2d 1273 (1979) (past consensual sexual acts with
defendant do not mean that the victim consented on the occasion in question); State v. Kalamar-
ski, 27 Wash. App. 287, 620 P.2d 1017, 1019-20 (1981) (evidence of sexual conduct between
victim and defendant 18 months before act being prosecuted was inadmissible).
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at an in camera proceeding. If the past conduct is determined to be
relevant, evidence of such conduct would be admissible, and the de-
fendant's rights would be protected. If the past sexual conduct is so
remote in time that it is not relevant to the issue of consent, the evi-
dence would not be admissible and the victim's nonconsent would be
effectuated.
The following language amending section 794.022(2) of the Sexual
Battery Statute is suggested:
(2) In a prosecution for sexual battery under s.794.011, evidence
of the victim's prior sexual conduct is inadmissible except where
consent is at issue, and it is first established to thpe court in a
proceeding in camera that:
a. Evidence of prior sexual conduct between the victim and the
defendant is reasonably contemporaneous with the date of the
alleged crime to be relevant to the issue of consent,
b. Evidence may prove that the defendant was not the source of the
semen, pregnancy, injury or disease,
c. Evidence tends to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior on
the part of the victim which is so similar to the conduct or behavior
in the case being prosecuted that it is relevant to the issue of consent.
Evidence of the victim's manner of dress at the time of the offense
shall not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution under s.794.011
unless it is first determined in a proceeding in camera that it is
relevant to the issue of consent. 62
The suggested amendments would enable the defendant to present
relevant evidence while insuring that a victim's consent is not incor-
rectly inferred by a judge or jury. A defendant's right to a full and
fair defense is constitutionally protected. A victim's right to dress in a
particular manner or to say "no" on a given occasion should also be
protected.
A stronger rape shield law should not only be enacted, but it should
apply to any pretrial deposition taken of the victim. Florida is one of
only a few states 63 that allows the defense to depose a victim as a
162. The intent of the 1990 Legislature with respect to limiting the admissibility of a sexual
battery victim's manner of dress might be better effectuated by the proposed language. This
would insure that relevance would be determined before the evidence was sought to be admitted
at trial.
163. Florida is among five states that permits criminal defense discovery depositions. Flor-
ida: FLA. R. CRam. P. 3.220(d); New Hampshire: N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 517.13 (Supp. 1989);
North Dakota: N.D. R. CRim. P. 15; Vermont: VT. R. Cms. P. 15. In Texas, the defense may
take depositions after receiving court approval. TEX. CRaM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 39.02 (Vernon
Supp. 1989). The defense is not entitled to take discovery depositions in federal criminal prose-
cutions. FED. R. Cium. P. 15-16. See generally Yetter, Discovery Depositions in Florida Criminal
Proceedings: Should They Survive, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 675 (1988) (discussing the history of
criminal defense depositions in Florida and identifying options for reform).
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matter of right. A rape shield cannot sufficiently protect a victim
from harassment and humiliation if it is not enforced throughout the
proceedings. This position was recognized by the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court in State v. Miskell.'" The court in Miskell expressed its
belief that the enactment of [New Hampshire's] rape shield law signi-
fied legislative intent to create a "testimonial privilege," the purpose
of which was to protect the victim "from being subjected to unneces-
sary embarrassment, prejudice and courtroom procedures that only
serve to exacerbate the trauma of the rape itself."' 6 The court deter-
mined that the underpinnings for the testimonial privilege "are
grounded in [New Hampshire's] constitutional right to privacy."'"
The holding in Miskell acknowledged that the public policy served by
prohibiting at trial irrelevant questions about a rape victim's past sex-
ual conduct is also served by prohibiting such questioning during a
victim's deposition.167 The court emphasized what rape victims have
long known to be true: "the major harassment and embarrassment
occurs because the victim must answer the questions, not because she
must answer them in public." 6 8
Under the decision in Miskell, "[tihe defendant must show, in a
hearing before the trial judge, that there is a reasonable possibility
that the information sought will produce the type of evidence that due
process will require to be admitted at trial.''169 Mere speculation is in-
sufficient. "A defendant must show that there is a reasonable likeli-
hood that admissible information will be obtained."' 70
This approach recognizes that a defendant's rights can be protected
without unduly harassing and embarrassing a person who has already
been victimized. Of particular significance is the court's reliance on a
state constitutional right to privacy. Such a right is expressly guaran-
teed in Florida's constitution, 7' and should be enforced in the context
of pretrial depositions of a rape victim.
164. 122 N.H. 842, 451 A.2d 383 (1982).
165. Id. at 385 (quoting State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 57, 426 A.2d 457, 459 (1981)).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 386 (emphasis in original).
170. Id. (emphasis in original).
171. Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution guarantees: "RiGHT OF PRivAcY-Every
natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private
life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's
right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law." At least one trial court
applied this guarantee in not allowing the defense to take pretrial depositions of young rape
victims and witnesses. See State v. Hines, No. 89-15331, 89-15534, 89-15708 (Fla. Daval County
Cir. Ct. 1989) (FLA. R. Can. P. 3.220(h), as it allows for discovery depositions of young victims
and witnesses of sexual battery, is an unconstitutional violation of the victims' and witness' right
to privacy under Article 1, Section 23, Fla. Const.).
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It has been suggested that pretrial depositions be eliminated; 72 how-
ever, the Florida Supreme Court has held otherwise. 7 1 If pretrial dep-
ositions are to be taken, it should be with the goal of discovering truly
relevant evidence, not with the purpose of harassing the victim. It is
not constitutionally required that a defendant's rights be protected in
a manner so solicitous as to further violate the rights of the victim.
Implementing the suggested amendments would help to insure that
a prosecution for sexual battery would focus on the criminal conduct
of the offender. Consent would not be subject to inference but would
have to be affirmatively demonstrated. A victim would not be blamed
for an attack by the introduction of irrelevant evidence as to the man-
ner in which she was dressed. An individual would have the right to
say "no" to an offender even if she had said "yes" at another time.
Of primary significance is the additional protection that would be af-
forded a sexual battery victim by strengthening Florida's rape shield
law and enforcing its provisions at a pretrial deposition of the victim.
Providing such protection is both necessary and long overdue.
Amending Florida's rape shield law to extend its application to pre-
trial depositions would insure that the offender, not the victim, is
placed on trial. It would effectuate a convincing argument made by
Judge Learned Hand in 1923:
Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our
procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man
convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is the archaic
formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and
defeats the prosecution of crime. 74
VI. CONCLUSION
Women are overwhelmingly the victims of sexual assault, yet histor-
ically men have determined whether a crime has been committed, if
the victim is credible, and if the evidence sought to be admitted is
relevant to the prosecution of the offense. Sexual assault is still de-
fined by and perceived through a male viewpoint. Women are sexually
assaulted and then publicly humiliated when they attempt to prosecute
the offender. Legislatures have reformed the law to better facilitate
the prosecution of sexual battery; however, the continued bias against
172. Tallahassee Democrat, November 12, 1989, at IB, col. 6, 3B, col. 1.
173. In re Amendment to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220, 550 So.2d 1097, 1098
(Fla. 1989).
174. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
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female victims of sexual assault sends a clear message that women still
do not have the right of self-determination accorded to men.
When the Florida Legislature reformed its rape law in 1974, it initi-
ated a movement towards affirming a woman's right to say "no" to
unwanted sexual conduct. In 1990, this same legislative body sought
to correct the injustice that still prevails in a sexual battery prosecu-
tion. By amending the statute to limit admissibility of a sexual battery
victim's manner of dress, the Legislature again attempted to state
what should be obvious-the victim is not the proper person to blame
in a prosecution for sexual assault.
Contrary to prevailing myth, women do not wish to be raped, nor
do they "ask" for such an assault. When women are sexually as-
saulted, their physical and psychic injuries should not be compounded
by a legal system that seeks to put their conduct on trial. The Florida
Legislature has demonstrated an understanding of this simple premise,
but it remains to be completely reflected in Florida's Sexual Battery
Statute.
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